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Water markets in Australia’s Murray-Darling Basin (MDB) and the US west are compared in terms of 
their ability to allocate scarce water resources. The study finds that the gains from trade in the MDB 
are worth hundreds of millions of dollars per year. Total market turnover in water rights exceeds $2 
billion per year while the volume of trade exceeds over 20% of surface water extractions. In Arizona, 
California, Colorado, Nevada, and Texas, trades of committed water annually range between 5% and 
15% of total state freshwater diversions with over $4.3 billion (2008 $) spent or committed by urban 
buyers between 1987 and 2008. The two-market comparison suggests that policy attention should be 
directed towards ways to promote water trade while simultaneously mitigating the legitimate third-
party concerns about how and where water is used, especially conflicts between consumptive and in 
situ uses of water.  The study finds that institutional innovation is feasible in both countries and that 
further understanding about the size, duration, and distribution of third-party effects from water trade, 
and how these effects might be regulated, can improve water markets to better manage water scarcity.   
 
Keywords: water markets, US west, Murray-Darling Basin, gains from trade  
 
 
1 R. Quentin Grafton is Professor of Economics at the Crawford School of Economics and Government, Co-Chair of ANU Water 
Initiative  of  The  Australian  National  University  (ANU),  ANU-UNESCO  Chair  in  Water  Economics  and  Transboundary  Water 
Governance and Honorary Professor of Economics at the University of Otago. Grafton acknowledges the financial support of the 
Commonwealth  Environmental  Research  Facility,  Australia.  Address:  JG  Crawford  Building  (Bldg  132),  Lennox  Crossing,  The 
Australian National University, Acton, ACT 0200, Australia. Email: Quentin.grafton@anu.edu.au  
2 Gary D. Libecap is Professor, Bren School of Environmental Science and Management and Economics Department, University of 
California Santa Barbara; Economics Faculty, Cambridge University; and Research Associate, NBER. Libecap thanks the International 
Center  (ICER),  Turin  Italy  for  research  support.  Address:  Economics  Faculty,  Cambridge  University,  Austin  Robinson  Building, 
Sidgwick Ave, Cambridge CB£ 9DE, UK. Email: gdlibecap@gmail.com     
3 Eric C. Edwards is a doctoral student at the Bren School of Environmental Science and Management, University of California Santa 
Barbara.  Address:  Bren  School  of  Environmental  Science  and  Management,  UCSB,  Santa  Barbara,  Ca  93106,  USA.  Email: 
eric.charles.edwards@gmail.com  
4 R.J. (Bob) O’Brien is the Managing Director of Percat Water. Address: Percat Water, 2 Beulah Road, Norwood SA 5067, Australia. 
Email: robert.obrien@percatwater.com.au  
5 Clay Landry is the Managing Director and a Principal of West Water Research, LLC. Address: Westwater Research, 205 N. 10th 
Street, Suite 520, Boise, ID 83702, USA. Email: landry@waterexchange.com     1 
1. Introduction 
Due  to  growing worldwide  concern  about  freshwater  supplies  and  ability  to  meet  new  demands,   
water security, defined as ‘the availability of an acceptable quantity and quality of water for health, 
livelihoods, ecosystems and production, coupled with an acceptable level of water-related risks to 
people, environments and economies’ (Grey & Sadoff 2007, p. 548), is becoming an increasingly 
important issue. 
 
Presently, 70% of the  world’s population lives in countries that withdraw more than 40% of the 
available water resources. If current trends continue, by 2025 up to a third of humanity will be living 
in  regions  where  water  withdrawals  exceed  60%  of  the  amount  available  (Shiklomanov,  2003). 
Furthermore, climate change is likely to increase both the intensity and variability of precipitation, 
resulting in more frequent heavy rainfall events and thereby more flooding, as well as more frequent 
dry  spells leading to  more droughts  (Bates  et  al.,  2008).  The  effect  of  such  changes is likely  to 
exacerbate  water  shortages,  with  a  forecasted  reduction  in  growing-season  precipitation  in  key 
agricultural areas, such as Southern Australia and the western US (Barnett et al., 2008; World Water 
Assessment Program, 2009), and increased water stress in many locations should rapid warming occur 
(Fung et al., 2010).   
 
Various supply strategies are being implemented to reduce water shortages including: construction of 
desalinization  plants;  increased  dam  and  reservoir  construction;  and  inter-catchment  transfers  of 
water. Given the high cost of future supply augmentation, alternative and demand-based approaches 
need to be developed. One way to mitigate water scarcity is to reallocate water from relatively low-
value  but  high  consumptive  uses  of  water,  such  as  in  agriculture  that  accounts  for  70%  of  all   2 
freshwater globally appropriated for human use (World Water Assessment Program, 2006, p.245), to 
higher value consumptive and non-consumptive uses. 
 
A demand approach to mitigate water scarcity includes the facilitation of water trading regimes and 
markets that allow lower-to-higher-value reallocations, thereby increasing the net value of production 
from a given water supply (Easter et al., 1998; 1999; Howe et al., 1986; Saleth and Dinar, 2000). 
Water markets also provide price signals that can encourage investment in water-use efficiency and 
indicate the costs of shifting water from consumptive applications to alternatives, including in situ 
uses. Typically, water markets have been limited to certain types of consumptive applications, in 
particular within irrigated agriculture, but they could be applied to the environment and across a range 
of consumptive uses (rural or agricultural and urban). 
 
When markets exist and are competitive, prices emerge from voluntary exchange between numerous 
buyers and sellers for homogeneous water (water of the same quality, reliability). These prices reveal 
the marginal values of demanders and suppliers (including the opportunity cost of using water in its 
current use, such as irrigation, or selling to an alternative buyer), as well as conveyance costs and any 
regulatory restrictions that are incorporated into the supply price. When an exchange takes place, one 
can conclude that the buyer’s willingness to pay for water is greater than or equal to the exchange 
price; that there is no seller available to complete the transaction at a lower price at that time; and that 
the seller’s value foregone by completing the transaction is less than or equal to the transaction price.  
 
Competitive, voluntary markets can have the desirable feature that no user can be made better off with 
a water reallocation without making any other user worse off provided there are no unaccounted for 
third-party effects associated with subsequent water use. Differences in marginal water values across   3 
uses,  as  reflected  in  market  prices  (agriculture-to-agriculture  exchange  prices  as  compared  to 
agriculture-to-urban exchange prices), that are not due to conveyance or other costs, indicate that 
there are potential gains for both buyers and sellers from reallocating water from lower to higher-
valued uses (consumptive and non-consumptive).  
 
In this study we evaluate the performance of water institutions in Australia’s Murray-Darling Basin 
(MDB) and the US West from the perspective of the gains from trade and institutional challenges that 
may limit these gains, as well as looking at the insights the two markets provide for water markets and 
policy reform. Both locations have defined water rights and conveyance structures to assist in the 
reallocation of water across competing demands. As these two regions are located in semi-arid areas 
subject  to  large  climate  variability  which  increases  the  risk  of  both  droughts  and  floods,  their 
experiences in water markets provide insights to other parts of the world where water scarcity is an 
issue. While both locations have a number of factors in common, there are also important differences 
regarding the nature of water rights and the extent of water markets that provide guidance as to what 
aspects of their institution and market framework are most effective at coping with water scarcity. Our 
contribution is to: (1) provide one of the first economic and institutional comparisons of water rights 
and regulatory structures for these two regions; (2) document the extent of water trading; (3) provide 
estimates of the gains from further trades; and (4) evaluate the institutional challenges that limit gains 
from trade in the two water markets.  
 
Section 2 provides an overview of the two water markets while section 3 focuses on the extent of 
water trading and the underlying institutional framework in the two regions. Section 4 explains the 
price differentials for water in different uses and quantifies the gains from trade in the two markets.   4 
Section 5 reviews the institutional framework that limits the gains from trade.  Concluding remarks 
about Australian and US water market experiences are provided in section 6.  
 
2. Overview of the Murray-Darling Basin, Australia and US West Water Markets  
2.1. Water Rights in US West 
In the US West, most water is allocated through appropriative water rights. The appropriative doctrine 
emerged in the 19th century in response to the development of mining and agriculture in this semi-
arid region where growing numbers of people and economic activities were increasingly concentrated 
in areas where there was too little water (Kanazawa, 1998). Prior appropriation allowed water to be 
separated from riparian land and moved via canals and ditches to new locations (Johnson et al., 1981). 
 
Under prior appropriation, individuals do not own water as they might own land.  Each state owns the 
water, which it holds in trust for its citizens. Individuals hold user rights that are capitalized into land 
values and that transfer with the land, or that can be sold or leased separately from it.  This attribute is 
the basis for water markets and security for investment in water-delivery infrastructure, agriculture, 
and other endeavors. 
 
Appropriative water rights in the US west grant possessory rights to a fixed quantity or flow, usually 
in cubic feet per second of water for diversion from a stream, based on the date of the original claim 
(Johnson et al., 1981, p.282; Smith, 2008, p.452, 467-72). These physical volumes assigned to holders 
of  appropriative  rights  must  be  used  ‘beneficially’  whether  by  the  right  holder  or  by  those  who 
purchase the water if it is traded. Entities with the earliest claims or senior rights have the highest 
priority and subsequent claimants have lower-priority or junior rights.  Diversions are filled by rank 
so long as there is sufficient stream flow.  During times of drought when only senior appropriators   5 
may  have their allotments  fulfilled,  junior  appropriators,  who  bear  most  of the  downside  risk  of 
drought, are especially dependent upon return flows from senior appropriators. Actions by senior 
rights holders to change the location, nature, or timing of use can  affect water consumption and 
influence the amount of water released downstream.
  Accordingly, water trading from agriculture to 
urban uses that involves export out of the basin and reduces return flows can impair third parties and 
is subject to state regulation to ensure that no damage is inflicted on junior diverters (Getches, 1997, 
p.161).  
 
Appropriative rights are conditional upon water being placed into beneficial use—the ‘use-it-or-lose-
it’ mandate ─ and no harm to third parties. Objections to trades can be lodged, and the burden of 
proof of impairment rests with the applicant.  The regulatory process and the costs associated with it 
vary across states, in part because the ‘no harm’ mandate is defined differently (Colby et al., 1989; 
Colby, 1990; MacDonnell, 1990; Thompson, 1993, p.704-5). If water is not used beneficially, the 
right may lapse under the doctrine of abandonment. The driest western states ─ Arizona,  Colorado, 
Idaho,  Montana,  New  Mexico,  Utah,  and  Wyoming  recognize  only  appropriative  water  rights 
whereas, the wetter states of California, the Dakotas, Kansas, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, 
and Washington recognize both riparian and appropriative institutions (Kanazawa, 1998).  Riparian 
rights grant water to adjacent land owners for reasonable use and riparian rights generally cannot be 
separated from the land.  
 
Beneficial use, however, can contribute to waste as rights holders devote water to low marginal-value 
‘approved’ applications in order to maintain ownership and the neglect of higher marginal-value uses 
that may not be considered consistent with the doctrine. It is this ‘marginal’ water devoted to low-
value uses that is the basis for most potential water trades.   6 
 
2.2. Water Rights in Murray-Darling Basin 
In  Australia,  surface  statutory  water  rights  in  the  MDB  are  defined  in  terms  of  diversions  per 
irrigation season. Beginning first with the State of Victoria in 1886, states have transformed riparian 
water rights into statutory water rights (McKay, 2008) although vestiges of riparian rights still remain 
in the form water harvesting for ‘stock and domestic use’ that can neither be traded nor used for  other 
purposes.  
 
In  the  first  half  of  the  twentieth  century,  Australian  states  used  their  acquired  water  rights  to 
encourage farming settlements in the southern MDB with the free allocation of statutory water rights, 
typically one acre-foot (Martin, 2005), and the construction of water storage facilities and public 
irrigation works (Connell, 2007). By the 1980s an over allocation of statutory water rights had led to 
increasing  pressure  for  water  rights  to  be  separated  from  land,  and  be  tradable  so  as  to  access 
increasingly scarce water. This led to the establishment of water markets for permanent water in the 
States of South Australia in 1982, New South Wales and Queensland in 1989, and Victoria in 1991 
(Murray-Darling Basin Commission, 1995, p.37).  Further reforms to water trading and the register of 
water  entitlements  occurred  in  the  1990s  following  an  agreement  by  the  Council  of  Australian 
Governments  (CoAG)  in  1994  to  separate  all  statutory  surface  water  rights  from  land  rights 
(Bjornlund, 2003). This reform greatly boosted water trade and this has been accelerated by further 
water  market  reforms  in  another  CoAG  agreement  in  2004  called  the  National  Water  Initiative. 
Among  other  commitments,  the  signatory  governments  agreed  that  water  entitlements  should  be 
exclusive, divisible and tradable and also recorded in public water registers. State governments also 
committed to the freeing up of the trade of water entitlements across state borders. 
   7 
A fixed cap on surface water extractions Basin-wide was imposed in 1995, but was implemented at a 
point when the nominal volumes of water rights within the Basin exceeded the long-term surface 
water availability. Although the Cap has stopped further growth in water extractions Basin-wide, it 
has  also  created  a  scarcity  value  for  water  rights  which  has  helped  to  trigger  the  activation  of 
previously  unused  water  licences,  called  ‘sleeper’  licences,  or  rarely  used  water  licences,  called 
‘dozer’ licences. The activation of sleepers and dozers has reduced the overall level of reliability of 
entitlements when these rights were activated (Quiggin, 2008) to the loss of those who held and 
actively used water licences.  
 
A possible concern asscoaited with higher prices for water rights is that could lead to investments in 
on-farm water use efficiency that may reduce return flows that arise from water leakage in both water 
delivery and use. A study by Qureshi et al. (2010) on the Murrumbidgee River in the Murray-Darling 
Basin shows that, although it is possible for on-farm efficiency improvements to lead to reduced 
environmental flows overall, this is an unlikely occurrence and would require direct subsidies for 
irrigation efficiency improvements.  
 
Statutory water rights in the MDB are called water entitlements. They provide the owner with a share 
of a consumptive pool, but the actual quantities of water that holders of entitlements are permitted to 
divert depend on the seasonal allocation that is assigned each year to the water entitlement.  The 
seasonal allocation represents an actual volume of water that can be diverted in a given irrigation 
season. The seasonal allocation, unlike the nominal quantity of the water entitlement is not fixed, but 
depends on the water entitlement’s level of reliability that determines the preferential access to the 
consumptive pool, the overall limit on diversions in the Basin that are set by catchment, expected 
inflows into the system, and water storage levels. The higher the reliability of the water entitlements   8 
the greater would be the expected frequency of years when the seasonal allocation equals nominal 
volume  registered  on  the  water  entitlement.  In  periods  of  above  normal  inflows  and  high  water 
storage levels, the seasonal allocation should equal the nominal amount on the water entitlement. 
However, in periods of low inflows or drought the seasonal allocation, at least for low reliability 
water entitlements, can be much less than the nominal amount on the water entitlement, and possibly 
even zero.  
 
3. Current Patterns of Water Trade  
3.1. The Nature of Water Trading in the US West 
All western states allow for water trades, but water markets in the U.S. are generally local, within a 
water  basin  and  within  a  state  due  to  differential  regulations,  institutions,  and  conveyance 
opportunities. There are three types of transfers—permanent sales of water rights, short-term leases (1 
year), and longer-term leases (up to 35 years or more). Among these, there are transfers among those 
who use the water for the same purpose—irrigated agriculture for example, or among those with 
different purposes—agriculture-to-urban or environmental, and transfers within a water basin—where 
sources are interrelated geologically, or across basins—out of one water region to another. Short-term 
leases within a basin among those who use water for the same purpose, such as farmers, have been the 
most common. Longer-term leases and sales of water rights often involve changes in the location and 
nature of use of water. 
 
Given that water markets are, typically, confined and because there are no central registries of trades, 
it is difficult to determine the overall extent of water marketing in the western US. Our data are 
interpreted  from  transactions  listed  in  the  Water  Strategist.  The  data  are  aggregated  from  4,220 
observations  from  1987  through  2008  for  12  western  states  as  compiled  from  water  transactions   9 
described  in  the  trade  journal  (the  data  is  available  at 
http://www.bren.ucsb.edu/news/water_transfers.htm). The Water Strategist is a monthly publication 
that details water transactions, litigation, legislation, and other water marketing activities.  The journal 
publishes each month a ‘Transactions’ section that lists, by state, various water transfers that typically 
include the year of the transfer; the acquirer and supplier of the water (both labelled variously as 
municipality, developer, company, irrigator, farmer, rancher, conservancy district, irrigation district, 
state, federal agency, etc.); the amount of water transferred; the proposed use of the water; and, if 
applicable, the terms, such as the price and nature (lease or sale) of the contract.  In developing the 
dataset, we often have to interpret entries in the journal where the discussion is unclear as to the 
nature  of  the  trade  (our  methodology  is  described  at: 
http://www.bren.ucsb.edu/news/water_transfers.htm). The data only include transactions reported by 
the journal, and hence, is not comprehensive because transactions are likely to be missed, especially 
those that take place within organizations, such as irrigation districts. Nevertheless, the entries are 
among  the  largest  available  across  states,  and  hence,  likely  capture  the  general  pattern  of  water 
trading.  
 
Figure 1a illustrates the yearly path of transfer volumes in the 12 western states from 1987 through 
2008  by  the  type  of  contract  used:  sales  of  water  rights;  one-year  leases;  and  multi-year  leases. 
Although one-year leases of water rights appear to have been the most active type of trade in terms of 
per-year volume, this is misleading.  Sales commit water permanently to a new user. Therefore, a sale 
of water in a given year actually commits that quantity of water in perpetuity. Figure 1b shows the 
total  committed  water  transferred  each  year  by  contract  type.  These  “committed”  quantities  are 
calculated  following  the  procedure  outlined  in  (Brewer  et  al.,  2008,  p.99).  Water  quantities  are 
projected forward  and  the  quantity  discounted  back  at  5% in  a  manner analogous to  finding the   10 
present value of a multi-year bond so that a comparison can be made between one-year leases and 
permanent sales.  Like a financial perpetuity, a purchased water right continues to provide access to 
the  same  volume  of  water  indefinitely  into  the  future.  Committed  flow,  like  present  value,  is  a 
construct to improve understanding. 
 
Figure 2 shows the price differential between one-year leases and permanent sales in dollars per 
committed ML (one ML = one million liters) in 11 western states excluding Colorado. Colorado is 
excluded because the large number of high-price, low-volume sales in the Colorado-Big Thompson 
Project (discussed in a later section) overwhelms the general trends in median prices in other states. 
The patterns in the figure indicate that although the committed measure compares one-year lease 
prices with the value of a one-year supply of permanently traded water, in recent years there has been 
a premium paid for permanent rights.  This is not an historic rule, however, as observed during the 
significant drought that hit the Western US in 1987-1992.  In this time period, it was not uncommon 
for  one-year  lease  prices  to  exceed  the  committed  price  of  permanent  transfers  as  parties  sought 
additional short-term water sources. 
 
Transactions vary substantially across the states reflecting differences in water supply and demand, as 
well as differences in property rights and regulatory institutions.  Colorado dominates in terms of total 
quantity of market transactions, where most are sales water. Sales as a share of transactions also are 
important in the most arid states of Arizona, Nevada, New Mexico, and Utah. Short-term leases (1-
year) are most common in California and Texas. Sales and long-term leases are limited in California, 
for example, by county ordinances that prohibit exports of water, and irrigation district bylaws that 
limit out-of-district trades.    
     11 
3.2. The Nature of Water Trading in Murray-Darling Basin 
In Australia, both entitlements and seasonal allocations can be traded. Water trade in the Murray-
Darling Basin accounts for about 60% of all entitlement trade and over 80% of seasonal allocation 
trade in Australia. By volume, over 12% of all water entitlements were traded in 2008-09 (National 
Water Commission, 2009, p.5) while about 20% of seasonal allocations were traded over the same 
period (National Water Commission, 2010a, p.21). For the period 2009-10 total water entitlement 
trade was over 1,800 GL (one GL = one thousand million liters) in nominal volumes of water while 
seasonal allocation trade totaled over 2,300 GL (National Water Commission, 2010b, p.5). The total 
value of turnover in entitlement trade was about $2 billion and in terms of seasonal allocations about 
$500 million in 2008-09 (all prices are given in US dollars while Australian dollars are converted at 
par because as of November 2010 1$US = $1Aus). 
 
After seasonal allocation trade was permitted in the 1980s, the MDB water market expanded greatly. 
Substantial  increases  in  trade  occurred  in  the  1990s  coincident  with  the  freeing  up  of  the  water 
entitlement trade, and again in the past five years as a consequence of the drought. Figure 3 shows the 
growth in the water traded by volume for water entitlements and seasonal allocations over the past 25 
years. The trade in terms of volumes for seasonal allocations has typically been much greater than 
water entitlements, but water entitlement trade has expanded at a faster rate in the recent drought as 
irrigators have sought to readjust their portfolios of entitlements in terms of their reliability.  
 
The millennium drought that lasted about a decade and that ended in 2010 fostered greater trading 
because of the dramatically reduced seasonal allocations of water. The drought led to zero opening 
seasonal allocations for many low reliability water entitlements in the recent past, and historically low 
allocations to high reliability water entitlements at the start of the irrigation season. To make up the   12 
shortfall those irrigators with high marginal values of water entered the water market to secure water 
that,  in  the  past,  they  would  have  received  as  seasonal  allocations  assigned  to  their  own  water 
entitlements. As a result, the volume of water trade has risen steeply. For instance, water entitlement 
volume  trade  increased  by  75%  between  2007-08  and  2008-09  and  increased  by  a  further  20% 
between 2008-09 and 2009-10 while seasonal allocation volume trade rose by 41% between 2007-08 
and 2008-09 and rose an additional 22% between 2008-09 and 2009-10 (National Water Commission, 
2009, p. 5; National Water Commission, 2010b, p.5). 
 
Beneficiaries of water trading in the MDB include, but are not limited to, perennial-crop farmers who 
irrigate orchards and vineyards and who, despite having high-reliability water entitlements, found 
during the millennium drought that their assigned seasonal allocations were less than they expected 
and required. Without the ability to purchase seasonal allocation water during the worst years of the 
drought, many of their vineyards and orchards would have suffered major harm or died. Sellers of 
seasonal water have also benefited as the increased volume of sales, at high water prices, provided an 
important source of income that has helped offset reduced irrigation and associated crop production.   
 
Market prices have responded to changes in supply and demand. For example, the severest years of 
the drought from 2006-2008 coincided with a peak in seasonal allocation prices, as shown in Figure 4.  
Higher  prices  have  encouraged  investments  in  on-farm  water  efficiency  and  have  contributed  to 
annual productivity improvements of about 3% per year over the past two decades (Australian Bureau 
of Statistics, 2008). The ability to trade and to adjust the volume and mix of high and low reliability 
water entitlements to reduce risks of insufficient water supplies has also permitted investments in 
perennial agriculture that may otherwise not have been contemplated.  
   13 
4. Price Differentials and the Gains from Water Trades  
Water markets help mitigate economic scarcity because they allow users with higher marginal values 
in use to purchase or lease water rights from those who have lower marginal values and, thereby, 
increase the aggregate benefits of water applications. These trades also produce important information 
about relative water values for regulators and judges in setting policy and resolving disputes across 
competing consumptive and in situ uses. Thus, large price differences across alternative uses of water 
that  cannot  be  accounted  for  by  differences  in  water  quality,  conveyance  or  other  costs  indicate 
unrealized gains from trade. 
 
4.1. Price Differentials in the US West 
In the US, a general lack of regional river basin-wide organisation for market trades makes price 
comparisons difficult to assemble since most water markets are local and comparable observations of 
trades within and across sectors are therefore limited. Accordingly, examining available price data 
must  be done  with  caution, but  the  patterns  are  indicative of  the  benefits  from  further  water  re-
allocation.  
   
Data assembled by Clay Landry and reported in Libecap (2011a, 2011b) for two regional markets, the 
Reno/Truckee  Basin,  Nevada  and  the  South  Platte  Basin,  Colorado,  show  significant  price  gaps 
between agriculture-to-urban and agricultural-to-agriculture transactions. For the Truckee Basin, the 
median price of 1,025 agriculture-to-urban water sales between 2002 and 2009 (2008 dollars) was 
$17,685/acre foot (an acre foot = 1,233.482 Cu. M. or 1.233482 million litres) or some $14,337/ML, 
whereas for 13 agriculture-to-agriculture sales over the same period the median price was $1,216/ML. 
For the South Platte, the median price for 138 agriculture-to-urban sales between 2002 and 2008 was   14 
$5,285/ML as compared to $4,304/ML for 110 agriculture-to-agriculture sales. Note that the above 
prices are given as per yearly flow volume. 
   
Aggregating transactions across markets and time can compensate for limited comparable transactions 
within  markets  in  order  to  gain  a  better  sense  of  differences  in  value  across  uses.  Of  the  4,220 
transactions in our data set with information on the transacting parties, amounts, and nature of use, a 
smaller number, 2,765, had price data.   Median prices across 12 western states between 1987 and 
2008 per volume of committed flow are presented in Table 1 for leases and sales for agriculture-to-
agriculture and agriculture-to-urban transactions. The annual mean and median sale and lease prices 
for agriculture-to-urban transactions are significantly higher than are agriculture-to-agriculture trades. 
This condition in part indicates the benefits of out-of-sector water transfers. If these price differentials 
are in excess of the differences in transactions costs, such as those due to regulatory review and 
conveyance  costs,  transfers  from  irrigators  to  urban  users  should  result  in  a  mutually  beneficial 
exchange.   
 
4.2. Water Price Differentials in the MDB 
During the millennium drought the price differentials between urban and rural water users was much 
less than in the western US. This is because markets are more active spatially across catchments in the 
MDB, at least in the southern part of the Basin. The market price for seasonal allocations of water 
varies by catchment and over an irrigation season, but range from $100 to $500/ML, although much 
lower prices have been recorded ($7/ML), and also much higher (up to $1,200/ML) during record low 
inflows in 2006-2007. By contrast, urban water consumers living in or near the MDB pay, depending 
on  the  city  or  town  and  their  household  consumption,  between  $1,100  and  over  $3,000/ML  for 
potable water and Australia wide paid on average $1,930/ML for urban water in 2008-09 (Australian   15 
Bureau of Statistics, 2010, p.44). Given the substantial costs involved in disinfecting and conveying 
potable  water  to  consumers  24  hours  per  day,  365  days  per  year  there  was  essentially  no  price 
differential between urban water consumers and irrigators at the bottom end of the prices charged to 
urban households during the recent drought. However, in periods of normal flows there is a basis for 
further trade because, even with pumping and water treatment, the price in urban communities is 
much higher than in rural water markets.  
 
To date there have been relatively few rural-urban water trades (Quiggin, 2006). South Australia 
purchased 18 GL of water entitlements in 2005 to provide additional urban water supplies (South 
Australia Water, 2006). The State of Victoria has spent over $700 million to construct pipelines from 
its northern catchments to pipe over 100 GL/year of water to towns and cities in the South. The 
Australian Capital Territory government, and its private-sector partner, is building a pipeline to pump 
water from the Murrumbidgee River, one of the largest tributaries to the Murray River, to a storage 
facility. After the pipeline is built, the plan is to access rural water by purchasing water entitlements to 
provide an additional source of supply of up to 20 GL/year.  
 
4.3. Gains from Greater Market Trading in the Western US 
The growing urban population in the American Southwest, with US Census data locating all 10 of the 
US counties adding the most population between 2000 and 2010 in Arizona, California, Nevada, and 
Texas,  indicates  that  water  markets  can  provide  substantial  welfare  gains  in  these  states  by 
transferring some water from agriculture to urban use. We can estimate the potential welfare gains 
under varying scenarios of a hypothetical increase in water trading from the agriculture to urban 
sector.  In  2009  the  US  Geological  Survey  (USGS)  published  water  diversions  by  state  for  2005 
(Kenny  et al., 2009). Using those  measures  as  indications of long-term water diversions and the   16 
annual trading data from the Water Strategist (2008), it is possible to present those trades as a share of 
the USGS 2005 data. The most rural states, Idaho, Montana, and  Wyoming, have markets which 
annually trade, in committed acre-feet, less than 3% of their total freshwater withdrawals (excluding 
thermoelectric withdrawals). For the key states of Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, and Texas, 
trades of committed water annually range between 5% and 15% of total state freshwater diversions. 
Data from Water Strategist indicate that over $4.3 billion (2008 $) was spent or committed by urban 
buyers between 1987 and 2008, with nearly $4.18 billion spent by urban buyers in the five key states 
indicated above.   
 
Price differentials indicate possible welfare gains from increased urban acquisitions.  For example, 
Table 2 reports the potential yearly welfare benefit of transferring 5% of the water currently used for 
irrigation to urban users at the median historical prices for both sectors. These indicative values are 
estimates of the relative social gains from moving some water from agriculture to urban use. They 
illustrate that the potential gains from rural-urban water trade for the five states, excluding Colorado 
that faces high conveyance costs in moving water to where the urban population is located, is in 
excess of $50 million/year. Although there is a limit to the amount of agricultural water urban areas 
will  buy  before  agricultural  water  prices  rise  and  urban  prices  decline,  for  Arizona,  California, 
Nevada, and Texas, high urban growth indicates strong continuing demand. Arizona, which has a 
centralized population and sufficient transportation infrastructure in place, already trades more water 
as a percentage of total volume extracted of any western state.  It, therefore, has more modest gains 
from increased transfers by our methodology, but there still exist significant price differences at the 
margin.  For  example,  Robert  Glennon reports  (2002,  p.207)  that land developers  near  the  Grand 
Canyon National Park offered more than $16,000/ML in 2001 for Colorado River water used by 
farmers in the Imperial Irrigation District (IID) who paid about $11.00/ML.   17 
 
4.4. Gains from greater water trading in Australia:  
Peterson et al. (2004) use a computable general equilibrium model to estimate the benefits of water 
trade in the MDB. The gains from trade within catchments and across states are greatest in years of 
below normal inflows, and are worth approximately $700 million ($2008) while in a year with above 
normal inflows the gains are estimated at $300 million ($2008).  This approach, and that applied to 
valuing water-trading in the MDB below, differs from the approach used above with the US data.  
Because  the  MDB  is  a  single  basin,  it  is  possible  to  approximate  the  full-equilibrium  affects  of 
complete water trading.  In the US dataset, each state’s data encompasses several basins.  Although 
some inter-basin trading does take place, valuing potential  gains using  a free trade  model would 
dramatically overestimate the capacity of infrastructure from the basins where water is sourced to 
cope with water removal.  Thus, the partial-equilibrium model we employ in the US West based on 
marginal  transfers  better  accounts  for  the  limited  nature  of  potential  inter-basin  transfers  in  that 
region. 
 
The most up-to-date and comprehensive review of water trading in the southern MDB was completed 
by the National Water Commission (2010a) in June 2010. Its key findings include: water trading 
increased the gross domestic product of Australia by some $220 million in 2008-09; it raised the gross 
regional product of the southern MDB by some $370 million; the gains from trade by state were New 
South Wales ($79 million), South Australia ($16 million) and Victoria ($271 million). The report 
concludes that, overall, trading between irrigators had a positive effect on the environment during the 
recent drought because it increased downstream flows that benefitted river systems while trading had 
no discernible impact on the timing of flows.  
   18 
There are also likely to be dynamic gains from trade associated with price-induced innovation in 
farming practices. Such benefits are difficult to quantify, but combined with the static gains from 
trade help explain why, when there was a 70% reduction in surface water use by irrigators from 2000-
01 to 2007-08, the nominal gross value of irrigated agriculture fell by less than 1% (Australian Bureau 
of Statistics, 2010) although profitability probably fell by a larger proportion because of the high cost 
of water during the drought.  
 
5. Institutional Challenges that Limit Gains from Trade 
The two water markets, while delivering substantial gains from trade, still have considerable potential 
to increase the benefits of water trade. We review the current challenges to trade in the US west and 
the MDB of Australia. 
 
5.1. US Water Institutions: Appropriative Water Rights 
Appropriative water rights in the US are denominated as specified amounts or flows of a highly 
variable resource stock with senior rights holders given right of use before persons with more junior 
rights. Consequently, the trading of appropriative water rights by senior rights holders can impose 
‘third-party’ effects on those who are not participants in the transaction such as junior rights holders, 
especially if the trades move the water downstream of where junior rights holders are located. These 
effects and their potential for impairment of the holders of more junior rights raises the likelihood of 
protests  and  litigation  over  water  trades  that  can  be  an  important  barrier  to  trade  by  raising 
transactions costs.  While it is true that until the latter part of the 20
th century third-party impairment 
generally was not an issue because most traded water stayed within the local agricultural community, 
today, there are much greater pressures to re-allocate water to other uses. Protests of harm from such 
trades are significant barriers that can keep water locked in lower value uses within agriculture.   19 
   
Rural  communities  may  also  resist  water  trades  to  urban  areas  because  of  concerns  about  local 
economic shocks, such as reductions in demand for agricultural labor and farm equipment.  Surface 
water  trades  can  also  lead  to  excessive  aquifer  withdrawal—22  of  58  California  counties  have 
implemented  ordinances  to  limit  surface  water  transfers  if  they  appear  to  diminish  groundwater 
resources.  Although identifying a legitimate concern, the major intent of these laws is to keep water 
within rural counties and limit reallocation to urban or environmental uses (Hanak, 2003, p.vii, viii; 
Hanak and Dyckman, 2003).   Additionally, the California State Water Resources Control Board can 
deny a proposed water transfer if would “unreasonably affect the overall economy of the area from 
which the water is being transferred.”(CA Water Code § 386). 
 
Concerns  about  pecuniary  and  technological  third-party  impairment  from  water  trades  generate 
regulatory and political opposition to greater market activity under the appropriative rights system. If 
instead, water rights were granted as portions or shares of the annual total allowable withdrawal from 
a  water  basin,  adjustable  according  to  precipitation,  then  all  appropriators  would  share  in  any 
adjustments in total diversions due to precipitation shortfalls.  Under this setting ‘junior’ parties would 
not be differentially impacted by drought or be as dependent upon released flows. Hence, the potential 
for at least technological third-party harm from trades would be reduced, especially if they are limited 
to consumptive use (Burness and Quirk, 1980, p.124; Johnson et al., 1981, p.274).  
 
An indication of this modification of appropriative rights is provided by the Colorado Big Thompson 
Project (CBT) in northern Colorado, where property rights are assigned via water shares rather than 
fixed quantities. CBT water is allocated through tradable uniform water units, whereby each is a share 
of the annual amount of water available to the District. The water in each unit fluctuates annually   20 
based  on  water  supply,  and  all  shares  are  adjusted  in  the  same  manner.  Because  shares  are 
homogenous, transfers across users, especially across sectors, occur with minimal fees and paperwork 
(Thompson, 1993, p.719; Carey and Sunding, 2001, p.305; Howe and Goemans, 2003, p.1058-9).  
Additionally, the Northern Colorado Conservancy District administers proposed trades and because 
the water is imported from another basin, all return flows are owned by the District and cannot be 
claimed  separately  by  other  parties.  This  provision  reduces  conflicts  over  potential  third-party 
impairment in water trades. For these reasons, the Colorado Big Thompson is by far the most active 
water market in the West in terms of numbers of trades, and sales prices for all uses are comparable.   
 
Given the long-standing nature of appropriative water rights in the US West, it seems unlikely that 
they would be broadly replaced by water shares. The distributional issues and uncertainties associated 
with such re-allocation would be too large. Nevertheless, there is innovation in rights structures in 
some  areas,  such  as  those  described  by  Richards  (2008)  in  New  Mexico.  In  five  severely  over-
allocated  and  important  water  basins  in  New  Mexico,  appropriative  rights  have  been  voluntarily 
modified to protect high marginal value junior rights holders and to stop excessive withdrawals in the 
face of growing demand and highly-variable supplies.  
 
5.2. Trade Restrictions in the Murray-Darling Basin 
As in the US west, trade restrictions can limit water trade and the potential benefits of water markets. 
Despite the fact that water worth billions of dollars is traded every year in the MDB, there is virtually 
no trade of water entitlements across states. While most of the gains from trade appear to come from 
intra-regional trade (Qureshi et al., 2009), restrictions across regions and states reduce the potential 
benefits of water markets. One of the more important barriers is the so-called 4% rule that was agreed 
to by state governments as part of the 2004 National Water Initiative, but as temporary measure to   21 
help manage regional adjustments from water traded out of irrigation districts. This rule limits out-of-
district entitlement trade per  year to 4% of the nominal volumes of entitlements in the irrigation 
district. At the end of 2010, only the state of Victoria has established a legally binding 4% rule and it 
has been a major barrier to inter-state trade of water entitlements from out of Victoria.  The Victorian 
government  has  agreed  to  begin  phasing  out  the  rule  beginning  July  2011  (National  Water 
Commission, 2010a p.2), although it remains to be seen whether this commitment will be fulfilled. In 
any case, the Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (2010, p.89-109) has also ruled that 
the 4% rule must be completely removed by 1 July 2014. 
 
Other transaction costs in completing trades across states also have imposed implicit barriers such that 
there  was  negligible  entitlement  trade  over  the  period  2007-2009  (National  Water  Commission, 
2009).  Since  2006  inter-state  water  entitlements  have  been  ‘tagged’.  This  means  that  the 
characteristics from the source catchment, in particular the associated reliability, are retained when 
used at the destination catchment. At the very least, this complicates the portfolio management of 
entitlements and the delivery of seasonal allocations at appropriate times during the growing season.  
 
A further, implicit constraint on trade is between rural and urban uses. While in many places in the 
MDB trades could take place between urban water authorities and rural water entitlement holders, 
such trades have been the exception rather than the norm. This may seem puzzling given the decision 
to invest multi-billions on desalination plants in cities that can access water from the Basin with 
existing infrastructure, such as Adelaide and Melbourne. The barrier stems from the state-ownership 
of urban water authorities, allowing some rural communities to oppose voluntary sales of water from 
rural  areas.  Rural  communities  are  concerned  that  water  removed  from  their  irrigation  district 
increases  the  fixed  costs  of  supplying  water  to  remaining  irrigators  and  may  decrease  economic   22 
activity,  and  reduce  employment.  This  fear  is,  to  some  extent,  justified  as  economic  modeling 
indicates that rural-urban water trade could reduce gross regional product in irrigation areas where 
water is exported (Dwyer et al., 2005). 
 
 A recent study by ABARE (2010) looking at the regional impact of proposed compensated reductions 
in surface water extractions by irrigators would reduce the gross value of irrigated agriculture in the 
Murray Darling Basin by about 15% and gross regional product (GRP) by 1.3%. They also predict 
that the investment in local communities resulting from the buy back of water entitlements from 
willing sellers and investment in irrigation efficiency would mitigate the fall in GRP to only 0.7%. 
Further, due to the regional benefits arising from investments in water infrastructure, they find that 
employment overall would increase by 0.1%. This does not mean, however, that there will be no 
negative impacts. This is because local communities and small towns that are dependent on irrigated 
agriculture  crops  that  have  a  low  level of  profit  per  megalitre  of  water will  likely  have reduced 
economic activity.  Nevetheless, other studies suggest that issues other than regional water trade have 
much  bigger  (positive  and  negative)  impacts  on  communities  than  water  trade  (National  Water 
Commission  2010a).  Whatever  the  cause,  an  important  consideration  to  policy  makers  is  that 
communities that may be negatively affected by the sale of water entitlements are given assistance to 
mitigate these third party effects (Miller, 2011). 
 
Another restriction on trade is the imposition of termination fees on irrigators who wish to sell their 
water entitlements and exit a defined irrigation infrastructure system. The termination fees are, by 
federal law, currently no more than ten times the annual access fee. These access fees  are  fixed 
charges payable by each irrigator who has water delivered by the infrastructure operator. Termination 
fees in 2009-2010 in the main irrigation districts of the MDB ranged from about 8% to as much as   23 
27% of the water entitlement sales price. These fees are an impediment to trade, and to the extent that 
the  initial  fixed  costs  in  establishing  irrigation  infrastructure  have  already  been  amortized  or 
subsidized by taxpayers, (Musgrave, 2008) are not economically efficient (Productivity Commission, 
2010). Whether all the lines and channels in existing irrigation infrastructure can profitably remain in 
use following water trade or with the buyback of water entitlements for environmental purposes is 
another important issue, but is not a barrier to trade. 
 
A related issue in terms of trade and risk management is the carryover rights of seasonal allocations 
from one irrigation season to the next. Carryover rights have been in place since the 1990s and have 
been  widely  used  in  Queensland  and  New  South  Wales  and  introduced  more  recently  in  South 
Australia and Victoria. Carryover rights differ by state and allow holders of water entitlements to 
carryover unused seasonal allocations so that water can be acquired when necessary provided there is 
sufficient storage space for the carryover amounts. This means that, during times of drought, they 
provide irrigators with the opportunity to manage inter-temporal risk by choosing the optimal time to 
use water allocations (Hughes and Goesch, 2009).  To the extent that carryover rights differ by state 
this may disadvantage irrigators where carryover rules are more restrictive, especially where there are 
inter-state  barriers  to  the  trade  of  water  entitlements.  For  instance,  as  of  30 June  2011,  seasonal 
allocation  carryover  from  previous  years  for  South  Australian  water  entitlement  holders  will  be 
discontinued, placing them at a disadvantage relative to irrigators in Victoria or New South Wales.  
 
6. Concluding Remarks: Opportunities for Reform 
Water markets have developed in both the US west and the Murray-Darling Basin in response to 
physical  water  scarcity.  Necessary  conditions  for  the  existence  of  such  markets  include:  (1) 
Decoupling of the use of water from land rights; (2) regulatory support for water trading; and (3) large   24 
water  storage  facilities  and  conveyance  systems  that  provide  ability  to  trade  both  upstream  and 
downstream and over time. Trade has expanded in both markets in recent years, but especially in the 
Murray-Darling Basin where institutional reforms and a decade-long drought increased trade to about  
20% of the total volume of surface water extracted in 2007-08.  
 
The gains from trade in both markets are substantial and have allowed for a substantially greater value 
of use from the water available. During the decade-long drought in the Murray-Darling Basin that 
ended  in  2009-2010,  water  trade  allowed  high  value  irrigation  users,  such  as  horticulturists,  to 
continue  irrigating  because  of  transfers  from  broad-acre  agriculture.  Reduced  water  availability 
reflected in higher water market prices over this period also induced productivity improvements that 
have allowed irrigators to maintain their gross value of production with a fraction of the extractions 
that they previously enjoyed.  In the US, the most arid and most urbanized states, Arizona, California, 
Colorado, Nevada, and Texas have active water markets, with trades of committed water annually 
ranging between 5% and 15% of total state freshwater diversions. Over $4.3 billion (2008 $) was 
spent or committed by urban buyers between 1987 and 2008, with nearly $4.18 billion spent by urban 
buyers in the five key states indicated above.   
 
Despite the clear benefits of water markets, their use in terms of trades across rural and urban uses is 
limited in both the US west and the Murray-Darling Basin. As a result, water is not allocated to its 
highest value in use and much more expensive alternatives to supplying water to urban communities, 
such as desalination have been implemented. In the case of the US west, the restraints in trade are 
primarily institutional while in Australia they are primarily choices made by state governments to 
avoid the objections to trade by some rural communities. In both countries, political opposition to 
expanded water markets is primarily due to fears about third-party impairment. Third-party effects of   25 
trade are important and are, typically, not fully considered in private market transactions. As a result, 
it is important that future research be directed to examining the pecuniaryt impacts on third parties 
more fully; particularly at the impacts of water trading on irrigation-dependent rual communities.  
 
Existing imbalances in water allocation are indicated by the continuing price differentials between 
agriculture-to-agriculture and agriculture-to-urban trades in the US, and by the higher prices paid by 
urban  water  consumers  compared  to  rural  users  during  normal  flow  years  in  Australia.  These 
imbalances, coupled with growing pressure to provide more water to meet environmental, urban, and 
recreational  demands,  as  well  as  the  high  economic  and  environmental  cost  of  alternative  water 
sources such as desalinization, show there is a great need for research on water markets. Attention 
should  be  directed  to  finding  ways  to  promote  water  trade  while  at  the  same  time  addressing 
legitimate third-party concerns, especially conflicts between consumptive and in situ uses of water.  
As  recent  history  has  shown  in  both  countries,  institutional  innovation  is  feasible  and  additional 
information  about  the  size,  duration,  and  distribution  of  third-party  effects  can  better  address 
legitimate concerns about the impact of water markets and water reform.    26 
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1a. Yearly flow volume of water transferred by contract type in 12 western US States. 
 
Figure 1b.  Total committed volume of water transferred by contract type in 12 western US States. 
 
Figure  2.  Median  price  of  water  transfers  by  contract  type  in  11  western  US  States  (Colorado 
excluded). 
 
Figure 3. Trades in Murray-Darling Basin water entitlement and seasonal allocation transfers, 1983-
84 to 2008-09.  
 
Figure  4.  Case-study  of  water  prices  in  Murray-Darling  Basin,  maximum  annual  price  of  water 
entitlement and seasonal allocations traded from Zone 12 of the River Murray-Darling 1990-2010.  31 













Median Price  $60  $15  $239  $117 
Mean Price  $154  $45  $354  $199 
Number of 
















Difference in ML 
(2008 $) 
Yearly Gain of a 5% Transfer 
of Irrigation Water to Urban 
Users at 22-Year Median 




Year (2008 $) 
AZ  3,133,044   $14.28  $2,236,598  $25,252,731 
CA  19,365,667   $32.72  $31,680,746  $77,992,925 
CO  12,334,820   $191.94  $118,380,995  $33,660,033 
NV  1,911,897  $142.50  $13,622,001  $19,092,630 
TX  10,780,633  $16.34  $8,805,878  $34,065,103 
 
 
 
 